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NOTES
THE RISE AND FALL (AND RISE?) OF INFORMATIONBASED INSIDER TRADING ENFORCEMENT
THOMAS A. MCGRA TH III
INTRODUCTION

As a general proposition, we all know what the "classic" case of insider trading looks like: when one trades in a security on the basis of
nonpublic ("inside") information regarding the security, issuer, or market for the security, one is engaged in insider trading.' We also know
that it is Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, that makes such activity illegal. 2 Usually we think of
the typical "insider" as being an officer, director, or other employee of
1. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement and Prevention § 1.01, at 1-4 (1992); Jill E. Fisch, StartMaking Sense: An Analysis and Proposal
for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 179, 179 n.2 (1991).
2. Insider trading is reached under the federal securities laws by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act" or the "1934 Act") and Rule lOb-5. Section
10(b) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of

investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
While § 10(b) is not self-executing, in 1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") promulgated Rule lOb-5, which provides in relevant part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R_ § 240.10b-5 (1992).
Section 32 of the Act provides criminal penalties for willful violation of the Act or
rules promulgated thereunder. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 21
of the Act gives the SEC broad investigatory powers and access to the district court for
injunctive relief to prevent illegal practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1988).
Section 10(b) does not provide for a private cause of action. Nonetheless, the courts
have implied one, limited to plaintiffs who are either purchasers or sellers of securities.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-31 (1975); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). To date,
enforcement of § 10(b) has largely been through civil litigation. See United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the issuer. Additionally, we may know that one who trades on the tip of
an insider (a "tippee") is also liable for insider trading. But whether a
particular instance of trading on insider information violates the law has
troubled courts for many years.3 The evolution of the law of insider trading has led, in many cases, to criminal prosecutions and civil actions
based on theories of conduct and harm, rather than proof of specific, enumerated elements of a crime or cause of action.' As the law now stands,
insider trading is really a conclusion drawn not from any statutory proscription, but from fifty years of jurisprudence and Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") enforcement. Most significantly, because
of the unique and storied history of insider trading law, not all trading by
insiders or tippees on nonpublic information is illegal. Consider the following hypotheticals.
(1) The chief financial officer of Widgetco, knowing the company
will skip a dividend, sells her shares before the announcement.
Insider trading? Yes.
(2) A legal assistant in a law firm's mergers and acquisitions department purchases shares of target companies before public disclosure. Insider trading? Yes. 6
But, compare the following.
(3) An investment bank, investigating takeover targets for Acquisition Corp., receives confidential information from one of the
possible targets. After Acquisition withdraws its bid, the bank
buys a large block of target company stock and uses the confidential information to induce a third company to offer a higher
7
bid. The bank reaps significant profits. Insider trading? No.
(4) The CEO of Conglomerates, Inc., without any motive for personal benefit, discloses to his estranged son that the company is
negotiating to be acquired. The son purchases
stock in his fa8
ther's company. Insider trading? No.
3. See Steve Thel, Closing a Loophole: Insider Trading in Standardized Options, 16
Fordham Urb. L.J. 573, 575 (1987-88).
4. For this reason, some have challenged insider trading prosecutions brought under
Rule lOb-5 as unconstitutional for failure to give "fair notice" that the conduct is illegal.
See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 766 F. Supp. 389, 402 (D. Md. 1991); United States v.
Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (contrasting explicit prohibitions of Rule 14e-3 with
Rule lOb-5's "catchall" nature), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). One commentator
has suggested that Rule lOb-5's vagueness is its strength because of its adaptability to the
current popular, academic, and later, judicial understanding of how corporate finance
and investing works. See Donald C. Langevoort, 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, underscore Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Happy Birthday Rule lOb5: 50 Years of Antifraud Regulation, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 57, S7 (1993).
5. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).

6. See Instigatorof Insider Scheme, ParalegalRecruit Plead Guilty, 24 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1637 (Oct. 23, 1992) (citing United States v. Garvey, Cr. No. 92-878
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1992)).
7. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
773 F.2d 477 (1985).
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(5) Issuer Co. begins a long-term debt repurchase program (that
does not constitute a tender offer) in anticipation of a larger restructuring likely to enhance the price of its bonds. Insider trading? No. 9
(6) The Executive Vice President of Garbage Co., knowing the com-

pany is about to sell-off a subsidiary and the transaction will
devalue the company's junk bonds, sells her long-term holdings
before the announcement. Insider trading? Maybe not.
(a) What if she takes the proceeds and buys company common
stock? Insider trading? Probably not, at least with respect
to the bonds.
(b) What if the original purchaser of the junk bonds was a
shareholder of Garbage Co.? Insider trading? Maybe.
This Note will examine the status of insider trading regulation in its
statutory formulation and, particularly, with respect to current judicial
theories of liability. Part I will focus on the original, "equal access" theory of insider trading liability, as it was developed by the SEC and the
lower federal courts. Part II will analyze the subsequent, so-called
"traditional" theory of insider trading as established by the Supreme
Court in Chiarellav. United States.10 This Section will also explore the
scope of the theory and criticism of its foundations and application. Part
III will address the development of the "misappropriation" theory as an
alternative for prosecutors and plaintiffs in light of the Chiarella doctrine. Part IV will analyze problems in insider trading regulation that
have developed under the Chiarella doctrine, exemplified by the treatment of options and debt securities. Finally, this Note will suggest that
the sometimes inconsistent results that have developed have grown from
efforts by the lower federal courts to reach all types of insider trading,
working within the common law restraints of Chiarella. This Note will
conclude that a return to the equal access theory will result in a more
uniform application of Rule lOb-5 and that, in fact, a return to equal
access analysis may be signalled by the ways in which courts deal with
the difficulties associated with reaching insider trading in non-equity
securities.
I.

INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY BASED ON UNEQUAL AND UNFAIR

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

The original theory of insider trading-the equal access theory-was
premised on considerations of fairness and the public interest in market
participants having equal access to corporate information-"the level
playing field."'" The SEC first applied Rule lOb-5 to sanction insider
9. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Insider Trading and Junk Bond"

lOb-5's Latest Frontier,N.Y. L.J., May 16, 1991, at 1.
10. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
11. The equal access theory should be distinguished from the parity of information
theory. Parity of information suggests that parties to transactions must act in reliance on
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trading in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,12 holding that one whose position
gives access to material, nonpublic information concerning a security has
a duty to disclose such information or abstain from trading.1 3 This became known as the disclose or abstain rule, the breach of which constituting a violation of Rule lOb-5.14
In reaching their decision, the Commissioners found that, traditionally, the courts and the SEC held that corporate insiders have a duty to
"disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their positions but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment."' 15 More specifically, the duty to disclose or abstain rested on two bases: (i) the
"existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone,"' 6 and (ii) "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."'" Applying this standard
to the facts before it in Cady, Roberts, the SEC found that a brokerdealer had breached its disclose or abstain duty and had violated Rule
10b-5 when it sold a company's stock in reliance on nonpublic information concerning the company's intended dividend action. The brokerdealer had obtained the tip from an employee who was also a director of
the company. Without awaiting public disclosure, the broker-dealer sold
its holdings, reaping significant profits.'"
Cady, Roberts was based squarely on the expansive purpose of Rule
lOb-5 and other federal securities regulations. Reasoning that the antifraud provisions are not meant to be specific, "but rather are designed
to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage
may be taken of investors and others,"' 9 the Commission concluded that
the securities regulations were meant to fill a gap in the common law
such that "misleading or deceptive activities [are reached] whether or not
they are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law acthe same information. The goal of the equal access theory is to assure that both parties
are able to obtain legally-through industry, diligence, etc.-the same information.
12. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
13. See id. at 911.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 912; see also id. at 912 n.15 (citing purpose of Exchange Act to eliminate
personal interests as an "emolument of corporate office," §§ 2 and 16 of the Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78p(b), H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) and S. Rep.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934)).
17. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
18. See id. at 913; see also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D.
Del. 1951) (majority shareholder who bought out minority shareholders, knowing firm
was undervalued, was liable for fraudulent non-disclosure); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373,
380, 381 (1943) (non-disclosure in purchase on behalf of issuer breached fiduciary duty,
placing shareholders at unfair disadvantage).
19. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
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tion for fraud and deceit."' 20 Put simply, and (ir)reverently, the common
sense import
of section 10(b) is "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
21
devices.'

The Commission, of course, found it unnecessary to say that fraud is
illegal in connection with a face-to-face sale or purchase of securities.

However, in the context of anonymous national exchange transactions,
where parties never meet, no special relationships exist to give rise to a
duty to speak. As will be discussed more fully below,' without this
duty, there was no cause of action for fraud under the pre-regulation
regime. Into this vacuum Congress infused Rule lOb-5, a new proscrip-

tion against misrepresentations in connection with the sale or purchase of

securities. 3
The courts initially and enthusiastically adopted the disclose or abstain
rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (hereinafter "TGS"). 24 In this
landmark case, the Second Circuit ventured even further than the SEC in
its interpretation of the equal access theory, holding that anyone in possession of material nonpublic information is subject to the disclose or abstain duty. 5 The court believed the disclose or abstain rule and the equal
access theory were consistent with congressional intent, captured in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, that investors "have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions" and are subject to the
same risks.26 The theory, or some form of it, was later approved by the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.20. Id. at 910 (citing Hooper v. Mountain States See. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961)).
21. Hearings on HR. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Committee on International and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (testimony of Thomas G.
Corcoran).
22. See infra notes 30-66 and accompanying text.
23. Necessarily, the information to be disclosed must be "material, nonpublic" information. In the proxy context, the Supreme Court has ruled that a fact is material if
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). That is, if the
reasonable investor would view disclosure of the fact as significantly altering the "total
mix" of available information, it is "material." Id. The Supreme Court expressly
adopted this standard in Rule lOb-5 application in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
232 (1988).
Information is nonpublic if it is not generally available to the public. With respect to
insider trading, however, this means that the market has not yet had an opportunity to
take account for the information and the insider maintains an "informational advantage."
Langevoort, supra note 1, § 5.03, at 5-9. For this reason, an insider must wait some
period of time after public dissemination before trading in order to permit the market to
take account of it. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
24. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The
court also made clear that disability from disclosing (due to corporate interest or confidence) is not a defense, but merely requires abstinence from trading. See id.
25. See id. The rule adopted by the court would properly be identified as a parity-ofinformation theory. See supra note 11.
26. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 851-52.
27. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1978); Fridrich v. Bradford,
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In TGS, the court emphasized the purposes of the 1934 Act: to protect
investors and to achieve efficient markets and a just price through the

requirement of disclosure because manipulation or secreting information
obstructs efficiency.2 8 Rule lOb-5, therefore, properly incorporated the

policy of insuring the justifiable expectation of investors that they will
have access, even on impersonal exchanges, to material information.29

After TGS, then, access to material nonpublic information carried with it
a corresponding responsibility, or duty, to disclose or abstain from trad-

ing. The equal access theory was based on basic fairness considerations
and a broad interpretation of the purposes of the securities laws generally, and specifically, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
II. THE REFORMATION: BACK TO THE COMMON LAW
Nineteen years passed between the promulgation of Rule 1Ob-5 and
the SEC's first insider trading action.3" Another nineteen years would

pass before the next major event in the law of insider trading. During
these intervening years, the law of insider trading had remained relatively
constant and was supported by the flexible framework of the equal access
theory. In 1980, however, the landscape of insider trading law changed

dramatically.
A.

The Chiarella Doctrine

In Chiarella v. United States,3 1 the Supreme Court limited the duty to
disclose or abstain to those in some special relationship of trust or confidence such that at common law they would be obligated to speak.32
Thus, the Court recoiled from the equal access theory and returned Rule
lOb-5's prohibition of insider trading to principles of fiduciary relations
and common law fraud. The Rule, wrote the Court, is a "catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud." 3
542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Wiggs, 443 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir.
1971).
28. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 858-59 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)). "[N]o investor, no speculator,can safely buy and sell securities upon exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the
value of the securities he buys or sells." Id. at 849 n.10.
29. See id. at 848.
30. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
32. See id. at 233.
33. Id. at 235. Some have interpreted Chiarella to mean that there can be no violation of lob-5 absent a fiduciary relationship between seller and buyer. See id. at 239
(Brennan, J., concurring); Langevoort, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-13 n. 1. An exception to
this rule has been carved out as a matter of fairness. Although never explicitly adopted
by the Supreme Court, it has been widely acknowledged by the courts that the absence of
a fiduciary relationship between an insider as seller and a non-shareholder as buyer is not
a defense to insider trading liability. "[F]or it would be a sorry distinction to allow [an
insider] to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a
beneficiary, although he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had become one." Gratz
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Vincent Chiarella was the employee of Pandick Press, a financial
printer on Wall Street. Having deciphered the codenames of three tender
offer targets, he purchased target stock and then sold his holdings--at a
significant profit-immediately following public announcement of the intended acquisitions.3 4 Chiarella was convicted of insider trading. The
Second Circuit affirmed the conviction finding that Chiarella had profited
from an unfair informational advantage by virtue of his employment. 3
The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding Chiarella had no duty to
target company shareholders.36
While the Court apparently agreed with precedent regarding the duties
of insiders,37 it expressly rejected the underlying theory of equal access
that had been the basis for Cady, Roberts3 8 and TGS.39 According to the
Court, the focus of insider trading analysis is common law fraud and the
duty to disclose that arises from a relationship of trust and confidence.'
Under the equal access theory, because a special relationship of trust and
confidence generally gave the trustee access to nonpublic information, it
also gave rise to a duty to disclose or abstain. After Chiarella, such a
relationship became a necessary condition of the duty to disclose or
abstain.
In the court below, the Second Circuit had, once again, espoused an
information-based theory, although its holding was less expansive than
its decision in TGS.4 1 In this second pass at insider trading, the Second
Circuit withdrew from its parity of information theory in TGS and
adopted the equal access theory originally enunciated by the SEC in
Cady, Roberts. That is, the court held that anyone with regular access to
information not available to the public is forbidden from trading without
disclosure.4 2 Ironically, on appeal, even this more conservative rule was
viewed as overreaching by the SEC and the Solicitor General. 3
v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (Learned Hand, J.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951), cited with approvalin Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 914 n.23; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
227 n.8.
34. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
35. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1373 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
36. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 237. Chiarellaalso marked a significant departure from
SEC enforcement, which, until that time, had been through civil actions. Chiarellawas
the first case in which a purchaser faced criminal liability for a 10(b) violation. See id. at
235 n.20.
37. See id. at 226-27.
38. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
39. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227-30. The Court was divided five-four on the duty to
disclose issue. (Although Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, he adopted Chief
Justice Burger's analysis). See id. at 239.
41. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980); infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text.
42. See Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, EvidentiaryPrivileges
and the Productionof Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 315. In the Supreme Court,
the government abandoned the equal access theory and took the position that liability,
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The Supreme Court agreed. Citing an absence of explicit congressional intent to the contrary, it refused to acknowledge that a duty arose
out of "regular access" to nonpublic information because to do so would
create a duty for all market participants in possession of such information. According to the Court, to do so would "depart[ ] radically from
the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties."' The Court based its conclusion on several grounds.
First, it recognized that common law misrepresentation creates a duty to
speak only where there is a fiduciary relationship or other relationship of
trust and confidence.45 Second, the Court noted that federal courts had
held that failure to disclose can be fraud under Rule lOb-5, but only
where there is such a relationship. 6 Third, the Court found no evidence
of congressional intent to create such a broad duty, nor had Congress or
the SEC ever adopted a parity of information theory.4 7 Fourth, the regulated, but permitted, use of material nonpublic information in other areas
of securities regulation (under the Williams Act,4" for example) implied
congressional reluctance to create such a duty.4 9 Fifth, previous
Supreme Court law stated that the 1934 Act should not be construed
more broadly than its language reasonably permitted. 50 Finally, the
Court believed a rule like that suggested by the dissent of Justice Blackmun-that such conduct is generally prohibited-would raise due process questions of notice for criminal and civil defendants. 5 1
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, adopted a rule more in keeping with the
and Rule lOb-5 fraud, was based on the breach of a duty of confidentiality owed to the
acquiring companies (Pandick's clients). See id.; infra notes 92-123 and accompanying
text.
44. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
45. See id. at 228 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
46. See id. at 229-30 (discussing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
152-53 (1972) (failure to disclose material facts creates Rule lOb-5 liability because defendant, although not a fiduciary, had assumed a relationship to act on behalf of the
injured party such that non-disclosure constituted a breach of duty)); see also Frigitemp
Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (party charged
with failure to disclose must have duty to speak); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus.,
403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (one who is neither a fiduciary nor an insider has no
duty to disclose material facts), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
47. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233.

48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988).
49. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233. Under the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l), a
tender offeror may purchase up to five percent of the target company's stock prior to
disclosure of its intent to acquire. Additionally, the Supreme Court noted exceptions to
the general prohibition against a member of a national securities exchange from trading
for its own account. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16 (citing § 11 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78k(a)(1) (1988)). The Court noted, however, that these exceptions, for example
allowing specialists to trade on their informational advantage, were created to preserve an
orderly market. See id. But insider trading serves no useful purpose. See S. Rep. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). But see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 894-95 (1983).

50. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).
51. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20 (comparing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
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lower courts. He advocated that "persons having access to confidential
material information that is not legally available to others generally are
prohibited by Rule lOb-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage through trading in affected securities." 52
He viewed the majority's imposition of a requirement of a special relationship as transforming Rule lob-5 from an "intentionally elastic 'catchall'" into an overly narrow regulation which catches relatively little and
makes investment in national securities markets "needlessly risky... for
the uninitiated investor. '5 3 Justice Blackmun argued further that the
Court's technical interpretation of the securities laws was inconsistent
with its prior flexible interpretations. 5" Furthermore, Blackmun argued
that the securities laws were not meant to replicate the common law of
fiduciary relations which, along with the common law protections against
fraud, were inadequate in insuring the fairness of transactions on "impersonal" national securities markets.55 Thus, although the majority
claimed support from precedent, Blackmun found the decision neither
"fully in step with administrative and judicial application of Rule lOb-5
to 'insider' trading," nor even "fully consistent with developments in the
common law of fraud."56
Advocating the equal access theory, Justice Blackmun again found the

majority's analysis flawed for failing to account fully for the importance
of defendant's access to confidential information unavailable to the ordinary investor.57 Moreover, according to Justice Blackmun, the trend in
the common law of fraud and misrepresentation was toward a more flexible and expansive application of the "special facts" doctrine to find a
duty to disclose where one party's superior knowledge of material facts

would make nondisclosure inherently unfair.58

Justice Blackmun noted that, according to Congress, the purpose of
the securities laws is to assure fairness of opportunity "without undue
52. Id at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 246.
54. See id. at 247; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
55. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977) and comparing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S.
768, 775 (1979)).
56. Id. at 247.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 247-48 (citing Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, MisrepresentationParti, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 526-27 (1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(e), cmt.
1 (1977); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-37 (1963); Jenkins v. McCormick,
339 P.2d 8, 11 (Kan. 1959); Jones v. Arnold, 221 S.W.2d 187, 193-94 (Mo. 1949); Simmons v. Evans, 206 S.W.2d 295, 296-97 (Tenn. 1947)); see also Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419, 431-33 (1909) (explaining the special facts doctrine). The special facts doctrine
was cited as a source for Rule lOb-5 by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur. See
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); Lewelling v. First
California Co., 564 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
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preferences or advantages among investors. '" 9 More significantly, and
contrary to the majority's interpretation of lower court cases, the existence of a fiduciary relationship had not been the deciding factor in applying Rule lOb-5. According to the SEC, the focus in Cady, Roberts was
on the unfairness of permitting the defendant to convert nonpublic information to his personal benefit.' In fact, in a later case, the Commission
expressly rejected the proposition that a special relationship is required
to create a duty to disclose.6 1
Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence had seemingly adopted this
stance. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,6 2 a bank was held liable under Rule lOb-5 because it failed to disclose material information it
obtained as a result of its "strategic position in the marketplace" and its
superior access to information.6 3 The Chiarella majority concluded,
therefore, that since the Court found a fiduciary relationship in Affiliated
Ute Citizens, a relationship of that kind must exist in order to establish a
duty to disclose.6 However, in Affiliated Ute Citizens, the Court's analysis did not center on the fiduciary relationship, but on what duty Rule
lOb-5 imposes, independent of the relationship.65
After Chiarella,the law of insider trading was returned, in large part,
to its pre-regulation position. Rule lOb-5 applied not to prevent the use
of unfair informational advantage, but to prevent trustees and others in
relationships of trust and confidence from overreaching in derogation of
their common law fiduciary duties.
B.

Who Has a Duty Under Chiarella

The radical theoretical reversals embodied in Chiarella did not, however, prevent the SEC from continuing to prosecute insider trading.
Rather, the Chiarella doctrine merely forced the SEC and the lower federal courts to formulate new theories and new relationships to reach different kinds of "insiders."
1. Traditional Insiders
The term "insider" remains undefined by statute. Generally, insiders
include officers, directors,66 and majority shareholders,6 7 but also may
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 94-229, at 91 (1975)).
60. See id. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 912 (1961).
61. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971).
62. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
63. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 229-30.
65. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 731-33 (9th Cir. 1974).
66. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
67. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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include any employee with access to confidential corporate information.6" Under section 16 of the 1934 Act, which regulates short-swing

trading by insiders, a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any

class of security is also an insider.6 9 Moreover, under section 16, courts

have construed an "officer" to include any executive employee who is
likely to have access to confidential information which would aid that
employee in a private transaction. 70 The equal access cases prior to
Chiarellanaturally suggested a broader definition which included anyone
in possession of nonpublic information.7"

2. Temporary Insiders
The obligation to disclose or abstain is not limited to traditional insiders or employees. It has been expanded to encompass the "temporary
insider" who is an outsider "clothed" with insider status.7 2 First developed in Dirks v. SEC,73 the temporary insider theory of liability recognizes that, in many circumstances, management requires the advice of
professionals-accountants, underwriters, lawyers, or consultants-to

whom the disclosure of confidential information is necessary to conduct

corporate business.74 Because they have entered into a "special confidential relationship" in the course of the firm's affairs and are "given access

to information solely for corporate purposes,"" such professionals become "temporary insiders"; they are temporary fiduciaries to shareholders and subject to the same duty to disclose as traditional insiders. 76
According to Dirks, temporary insider status does not depend solely

on the receipt of nonpublic information. Rather, the analysis focuses on
the outsider's entrance into a special relationship of confidence for the
purpose of conducting corporate business and to whom the corporation
68. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 10 n.8.
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
70. See Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
71. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (anyone with
regular access), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (anyone in possession of material nonpublic information),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
72. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 1759 (1992).
73. 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1759 (1992); SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971) (potential investors who received and
traded on information from prospective underwriter are liable); In re Van Alstyne, Noel
& Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-85 (1969) (broker-dealer entrusted with nonpublic information is liable for disseminating to customers who traded); In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968) (same); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (same); Instigator of Insider Schemea ParalegalRecruit Plead
Guilty, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1637 (BNA) (Oct. 23, 1992) (citing U.S. v. Garvey, Cr.
No. 92-878 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1992)).
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gives access to information for corporate purposes only." Additionally,
for the breach of such a duty to predicate a violation, the corporation
must expect confidentiality such that the relationship implies a duty.78
Note that the equal access cases predicated liability, at least in part, on
this express ground-the conversion of corporate information for personal gain. 79
3.

Tippee Liability

Although the Dirks Court created a new class of insiders, it also placed

restrictions on when "tippees" are liable under Rule lOb-5 for trading on
information received from an insider.8 0 The Court held that a tippee
assumes an insider's duty of disclosure when the tippee receives informa-

tion from an insider in breach of that insider's fiduciary duty and the
tippee knows or should have known there has been a breach."
The SEC's original formulation of tippee liability depended only on the

tippee's knowledge that the information was nonpublic and obtained
"improperly."8 2 Under Dirks, it is crucial that the tippee knows that the
insider has breached a duty. 3 Where the existence of a breach is not
obvious-for instance, where disclosure is made by mistake or the insider

is unsure whether the information is material-the purpose of the disclo-

sure determines liability. 4 Thus, if an insider personally has benefitted
or will benefit from the disclosure, and in this manner, deceives, defrauds, or manipulates shareholders, there is a breach of fiduciary duty
owed to the shareholders.8 5 According to the Court "[a]bsent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to shareholders. And absent
a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach."8 6 Presumably,
77. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
78. See id.; see also Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir.
1980) (no agreement of confidentiality).
79. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
80. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661. A "tippee" is an outsider who receives material nonpublic information (a "tip") from an insider, who is then designated a "tipper." See id. at
651.
81. See id. at 660, 671 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); SEC v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197, 200 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 1053 (1985); In re Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 633, 651 (1971). When this test is satisfied, the tippee is
said to have "inherited" a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders. See
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 565.
82. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 641. A tippee's liability is derivative, see
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659, and arises from his "role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12
(1980).
83. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-61.
84. See id. at 662.
85. See id. at 662-63 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980)).
86. Id. at 662. What constitutes personal gain may include direct or indirect pecuniary gain or even enhanced reputation that will lead to future monetary gains. See id. at
663. It may also include the transfer of a gift to the recipient of the information in the
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given the Court's standard, a tipper will be able to assert a good faith
defense, even where there is personal benefit, if such benefit was not the
intent or purpose of disclosure.
In denying the SEC contention that anyone who receives material nonpublic information from an insider has a duty to disclose, the Court reaffirmed its rejection of the equal access theory. 7 It recognized, however,
that to permit insiders to circumvent insider trading proscriptions by acting through a third party would be antithetical to the purpose of the
securities laws."8 However, the Court rejected the equal access theory
with respect to tippee liability because such a rule might chill the incentive for investment analysts to investigate corporate matters and values
by speaking with officers and directors. 9
While the Court apparently does no more than continue under the rule
of Chiarella,the language of Dirks could be viewed as an entrenchment
into the law of fiduciary obligations. In Chiarella,the Court was careful
to characterize the duty-triggering relationship as one of "trust and confidence" without labelling it as fiduciary. In Dirks, the Court discusses
only fiduciary relationships. The rule of Dirks would likely apply to one
with a "special relationship of trust and confidence" but without a strict
fiduciary relationship. Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, took issue with the yet additional restriction on
the scope of the securities laws reflected in the requirement of personal
benefit as a predicate for breach of a fiduciary duty.90 According to the
dissent, fiduciary duties-if they are to be the standard in securities
cases-have never been premised on gain to the trustee. Rather, they
exist to protect beneficiaries from harm or loss.91
The effect of these developments is difficult to assess. On one hand, the
Court expanded the reach of insider trading prohibitions to prevent temporary insiders from profiting from their access to nonpublic information. Conversely, much of the flexibility of tippee liability was
eliminated, leaving this formidable enforcement tool somewhat weakened. The most significant post-Chiarella development, however, came
in the form of the misappropriation theory.
form of profits from use of the information. See id. at 664. The SEC takes a broad view
of what is a gain. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing
Complaint, SEC v. Phillip J. Stevens, No. 91 Civ. 1869 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 19, 1991))
(sole benefit to insider is enhanced reputation).
87. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1983).
88. See id. at 659-61; 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1988) (unlawful to do indirectly "through or
by means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the securities laws); cf Mosser
v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951) (one who participates with a fiduciary in a breach is
as forbidden as the trustee himself).
89. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59.
90. See id at 667-68, 671-73.
91. See id at 673-74.
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MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY

The misappropriation theory, which grew out of Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Chiarella,has been adopted by at least four circuit courts as a
means of getting at insider trading which cannot otherwise be reached
under the Chiarelladuty formula.92 Under the misappropriation theory,
"it is fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security-and
therefore a violation of Rule lOb-5-for a person to trade in securities in
breach of fiduciary duty by secretly converting
for personal use, informa93
tion which has been entrusted to him."
The traditional theory, as structured by Chiarella, with its corollary
theories of temporary insiders and tippee liability, left significant gaps in
insider trading enforcement.94 For example, there was no sanction for
trading in one company on information emanating from another

source. 95 Since Chiarella had breached no duty to the shareholders of
the companies in which he traded, he did not violate Rule lOb-5. 96 Nor
was it a violation to trade on material nonpublic information received
from an insider whose disclosure was not made in breach of a duty. In
Dirks, petitioner, who was an officer of a broker-dealer, traded on information that a company's assets were overstated. 97 An officer of the company had communicated the information to him. Since the company
officer received no benefit, but rather made the disclosure to uncover a
fraud, the Court held there was no violation. 98
In response to Chiarella and Dirks, the SEC, federal prosecutors and
lower federal courts searched for a way to reach "bad" behavior which
did not rise to Rule lOb-5 fraud as limited by the Chiarelladuty requirement. 99 The result of their search was the misappropriation theory. Ac-

92. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 & n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966
(1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d
818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other groundsafter remand, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), affd
after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). No court has
rejected it. See Langevoort, supra note 1, § 6.01, at 6-2 to 6-3.
Although never the subject of a Supreme Court holding, the misappropriation theory
has been adopted by the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. The Supreme
Court did consider the theory in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), but
because a securities fraud conviction under the theory was affirmed by an evenly divided
Court, it is not entitled to precedential weight. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192
(1972).
93. Langevoort, supra note 1, § 6.01, at 6-1.
94. See id. § 6.02, at 6-2.
95. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).
96. See id. at 232-37; accord SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming
conviction on theory that defendant misappropriated information of and defrauded employer), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
97. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983).
98. See id. at 667.
99. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12,
15 (2d Cir. 1981), afld after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (indictment formulated to remedy the
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cording to the Ninth Circuit, under the misappropriation theory,
Rule lOb-5 is violated when a person (1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship
of trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities
transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock.1°°
While the misappropriation theory draws generally on the dissent of
0
Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella,"
the breadth of his theory of liability-an absolute duty to disclose and resulting fraud upon failure to do
so 1° 2-- has been rejected in favor of basing fraud on the breach of a duty

of confidentiality itself.10 3 The significant uniqueness of the misappropriation theory is that, analytically, the predicate fraud is not in a failure to

disclose information to the marketplace, nor is it grounded in a duty to
shareholders of the traded stock. Rather, it is a fraud perpetrated upon
the person who entrusted the information to the trustee1t 4 The theory
of fraud draws on the "upon any person" language of Rule lOb-5.1 5 In
some ways, then, it resembles the fraud found in Cady and TGS which

was based, at least in part, on a trustee's duty not to convert confidential
information to her own use. 6 Although arguably motivated by an equal
access goal, in application, the theory is distinguishable from the equal
access theories of Cady and TGS. The misappropriation theory molds

itself to the Chiarella duty requirement and locates a breach of duty in
the misappropriation of nonpublic information. In Chiarella,for example, the defendant committed a fraud upon the owners of the information-the bidders who had entrusted confidential information to
deficiency in Chiarella), cert denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Langevoort, supra note 1,
§ 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-3; see also Note, Insider Trading in Junk Bonds, 105 Hare. L Rev.
1720, 1734 (1992) (discussing that in response to Chiarella, courts and commentators
proposed the misappropriation theory).
100. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-03 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
101. 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102. See id.
103. See id.; SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
966 (1992); Clark, 915 F.2d at 445 & n.8; Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15-17
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Langevoort, supra note 1, § 6.01, at 61.
The government offered the theory as an alternative basis to support Chiarella's conviction. Because it was never submitted to the jury, however, the majority declined to
consider it. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235-36.
104. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. CL 1759 (1992); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd
by equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987). For this reason, it is also known as the
"fraud on the source" theory. See Langevoort, supra note 1, § 6.02, at 6-3.
105. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985).
106. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n. 15 (1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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Chiarella's employer.107
Nonetheless, the theory is supported post hoc by Congress in its observations concerning the goals of the securities laws: "In the view of the
Committee,... securities fraud [by misappropriation] should be encompassed within section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."' 0 8 Notably, this formulation of the goals of the securities laws emphasizes the misuse of
confidential information rather than the breach of a duty.
The result of the misappropriation theory is that some Rule 1Ob-5 violations are premised on harms to those who are not investors. Investor
protection-the intended goal of antifraud laws-becomes merely derivative. For instance, in United States v. Newman,"0 9 a misappropriator and
tippees were liable where their acts "sull[ied] the reputations" of the broker-dealers "as safe repositories of client confidences" as if they had stolen their employer's money. 110 Also injured by the trading were the
broker-dealer and its clients.1"' While the court acknowledged harm to
the acquiring companies due to a rise in the market price of target company stocks," 2 it did not base its holding on that harm. Similarly in SEC
v. Materia,113 the court found injury where defendant, by his fraud, had
undermined the integrity of his employer-a financial printer."14 Finally,
in SEC v. Cherif,15 a breach of duty to defendant's former employer may
have "eroded client confidence... by suggesting the company's susceptibility to treachery from within.""' 6 From these decisions, it would appear that the class to be protected by the securities laws, specifically Rule
lOb-5, are those who are active players in the securities markets-brokerdealers, underwriters and dealers-rather than the "ordinary" investor.
This result was not merely a theoretical inconsistency, however. For a
time, in Rule lOb-5 civil actions brought under the misappropriation the107. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 244-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
108. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Report on the Insiders Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, H.R. Rep. No. 355, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1983), reprintedin 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277 (citing United States V. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981));
see id. at 4-5, 13 n.20, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2277-78, 2286; see House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce Report on the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, H.R. Rep. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 26-27, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6047, 6063-64 [hereinafter ITSFEA House Report].
109. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 17; see SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 966 (1992).
111. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. Newman concerned trading in anticipation of a
tender offer prior to the promulgation of Rule 14e-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1992))
which prohibits insider trading in connection with such transactions. See Newman, 664
F.2d at 16 n.3.
112. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
113. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
114. See id. at 202; see SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
115. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
116. Id. at 412.
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ory, the duty to disclose affected the question of standing.' 17 If the mis-

appropriation and, therefore, the predicate fraud, was upon a third-party
source and not the corporation or shareholders, shareholders had no
standing to sue for a lOb-5 violation." 8 The misappropriation theory
was thus available only to the government 1 9 until Congress expressly
created a private cause of action in the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act ("ITSFEA"). This act provided that any violator of the antifraud laws is liable to those who buy or sell the security
contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of the violator.' 20 Note
that when it came time to cure this defect for private plaintiffs, the Congress was led-inexorably-by an information theory as evidenced by the
legislative history which emphasized the possession of information,
rather than the breach of duty. 2 By the ITSFEA, Congress apparently
reintroduced the parity of information rule into securities regulation." z
IV.

THE

"DUTY-GAP" OF NON-EQUrry

SECURITIES

With respect to equity securities, the Chiarelladuty requirement posed
a significant, but surmountable obstacle to insider trading prosecutions.
Regarding non-equity securities, however, the lack of any duty owed by
insiders to the holders of such instruments threatened to bar any cause of
action.

A.

Options

Just as the courts have stretched the Chiarella duty requirement to
enforce Rule lOb-5 against "outside" insider traders, so too have they
strained to reach insider trading in options.' 23 From the very beginning,
legislators recognized that "[m]any of the most flagrant abuses upon
117. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985).
118. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1983) (arising
from the same facts as Newman, shareholders have no cause of action since fraud was
upon broker-dealer and its clients), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
119. See SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 618 n.41 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
121. See ITSFEA House Report, supra note 109, at 26-28.
122. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 452, 453 n.25 (9th Cir. 1990).
123. An option is a contract to buy ("call") or sell ("put") a certain number of shares
at a certain price within a fixed period of time. While options provide a form of "insurance" for investors, allowing them to hedge against future fluctuations in a security's
market price, they are more often used as a means of speculation since they require little
capital outlay (the contract price). See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 251 & n.4 (1983). Options are securities under, and subject to, the restrictions of, the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Section 3(a)(10) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10),
states" 'security' means any... stock.., or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing." Courts have had no difficulty concluding that these terms embrace
options. See Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 (D. Mass. 1972); Globus, Inc. v.
Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.
Supp. 262, 292 (S.D.N.Y 1966), modified on other grounds, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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stock exchanges would not be possible without the aid of options."12 4
Despite this clear intent to prohibit abuses in the options markets, the
Chiarelladuty requirement threatened the viability of Rule lOb-5 actions
for insider trading in options.' 2 5 As distinct from equity securities, options are mere contracts, issued independently of the firm and "stand[ ]
alone, claiming no equity in the corporation, entitled to no vote, and with
no fiduciary obligation of the management to the optionholder's interest."1 26 The seller of an option1 27 is not usually a shareholder of the
issuer and, therefore, is not in a relationship of confidence and trust giving rise to a duty to disclose on the part of an insider. 128
In the wake of Chiarella,a number of courts declared that the disclose
or abstain rule was inapplicable to options trading.1 29 This apparent
loophole defied common sense: "[i]f insider trading in equities is forbidden to prevent insiders from reaping secret profits, 'then insider trading
in options--designed to capture the same secret profits-must also have
been prohibited.' "1 0 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
("ITSA") closed this gap by making the jurisprudence of insider trading
applicable also to options and similar securities.131
The ITSA, however, creates an anomaly in the law of insider trading:
the courts have concluded that the abstain or disclose rule is triggered
only where a fiduciary duty is owed; they also have concluded that option sellers and holders are owed no fiduciary or other duty by corporate
insiders; nonetheless, Congress, in the ITSA, has made clear that the disclose or abstain rule should apply in some situations absent a fiduciary
duty. 13 2 This inconsistency is subject to varied interpretations. At first
blush, it might seem that by overcoming the duty requirement with respect to options, but ignoring other securities, Congress has manifested
an intent that only equity securities and options should be regulated. A
similar conclusion is sometimes reached with respect to Congress' reluc124. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
125. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9, at 1.
126. Starkman v. Warner Communications, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 297, 304 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
127. In the case of standardized options trading, the Options Clearing Corporation, a
commonly-owned transfer agent for options, is usually the seller. See Langevoort, supra
note 1, § 3.03[1], at 3-14 to 3-15.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Laventhal v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 413 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529
F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
130. Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 8, Bianco v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (quoted in Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9, at

1).

131. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1988)) ("Wherever communicating, or
purchasing or selling a security while in possession of, material nonpublic information
would violate ...

any provision of this chapter... such conduct in connection with a

purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option or privilege ... shall also violate [the
Act]."); see also Langevoort, supra note 1, § 3.03[l], at 3-15; Thel, supra note 3, at 575.
132. See Langevoort, supra note 1, § 3.03[l], at 3-15.
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tance to statutorily define insider trading in order to cure the gaps in
equity and debt securities left by the Chiarellaformulation. 133 However,
with respect to debt securities, there was-and still is-a fundamental
reluctance to create any obligation to bondholders."
Above all, the
SEC feared that defining insider trading would weaken its enforcement
power and create a roadmap to risk-free profits for sophisticated traders. 135 One commentator has noted that Congress' action reflects a fundamental belief that allowing corporate insiders to trade on material
nonpublic information is simply unfair (the equal access theory) because
if insider trading is wrong only when it is breach of some duty, it would
not be objectionable in options. 1 36 Another concluded that while Congress was willing to adopt the flexible tests of the lower1 courts,
it believed
3
the resulting prohibition must be extended to options. 1
Interestingly, by overcoming the duty requirement, but still tying liability in options to the prevailing judicial theory in equity securities, Congress has allowed for a shift in judicial philosophy that might create a
less stringent duty requirement. Additionally, since the loophole was not
entirely open, 131 it can be argued that Congress, while approving of the
misappropriation theory, recognized its weaknesses. It thus moved, as a
matter 139
of policy, to close the gap completely in a field so susceptible to
abuses.

B. Debt Securities
The Chiarelladuty gap that created a loophole in options trading likewise created opportunities for insider trading in debt securities and a corresponding (and continuing) strain by the lower federal courts to reach
such activity under Rule lOb-5. While there are some ways to reach insider trading in debt securities,"4 the conclusion that the insider trading
133. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 181 n.7.
134. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 667, 668 (1984); Note, Insider Trading in Junk Bonds, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1720, 1733-34 (1992).
135. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 181 n.7.
136. See Thel, supra note 3, at 575, 576 (citing inter alia Securities Exchange Act
§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) ("for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information"); Gregory S. Crespi, Private Rights of Action for Option Position Holders
UnderSection 20(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act, 16 Sec. Reg. LJ. 21, 25 (1988) (making fairness argument)).
137. See Langevoort, supra note 1, § 2.04[2], at 2-21 to 2-22.
138. Insider trading in options could still be reached through the misappropriation
theory. See e.g., O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179,
1187-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
139. See Langevoort, supra note 1, § 3.03[1], at 3-15.
140. First, because the misappropriation theory does not depend on a relationship between the trader and the security-holder, but rather on some other relationship of confidence and trust, the theory appears to be applicable to misappropriation trading in debt
securities. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9, at 1. Second, Rule 14e-3 is not dependent on any special relationship and remains a valid tool to prosecute insider trading
in connection with tender offers. Third, the SEC has taken the position that members of
a creditor committee are "temporary insiders" and subject to the same insider trading
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laws do not apply to debt securities is largely accurate
14 and has been
widely recognized in both legal and non-legal writing. '
Generally, because bonds are fixed obligations whose market prices do
not fluctuate as sharply as stocks, there is not as much opportunity for
exploitation by trading on inside information. 142 Junk bonds, however,
trade more like common stock than the usual debt security,1 43 and their

volatile nature makes them far more susceptible to insider trading gains.
Reports also suggest that insider trading in junk bonds has been
widespread. 1'
Traditionally, an issuer, its officers, and directors owe no duty to bond-

holders outside those delineated by the indenture. 145 Conversely, stockholders, whose interests are created in the corporate charter and articles

of incorporation are viewed as owners of the corporation. 46 They have a
relationship with insiders which gives rise to implied duties of care, loyalty, honesty, and disclosure, beyond the rights set out in any written
instrument. Moreover, courts rarely find implied covenants of fair deal-

ing in indentures. This is so because courts look to the instrument itself
to find the duty rather than the relationship between debtholders and the
corporation. 4 7 Absent a duty, there can be no breach. Absent a breach,
there can be no fraud. And absent a fraud, there can be no Rule lOb-5

violation.
Several commentators have criticized the conclusion that bondholders
are owed no duty; they have called for the recognition of duties of care
and loyalty and a cause of action for abuses by corporate management
with respect to bondholders. They note that the law sometimes imposes
restrictions as true insiders. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 5, In re Federated Dep't Stores (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 1991)
(No. 1-90-00130) (quoted in Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9, at 1).
141. See Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker 217 (1989) ("Now it is quite illegal to trade in
stocks on inside information . . . But there is no such law regarding bonds.");
Langevoort, supra note 1, § 3.03[2], at 3-16.
142. See Langevoort, supra note 1, § 3.0312], at 3-16.
143. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law.
413, 417 (1986). Junk bonds are "subinvestment grade securities" rated less than BB+
by Standard and Poor's or Baa by Moody's.
144. See Robert Lenzner, Insiders Thrive as Junk Bonds Get New Cachet, Boston
Globe, Apr. 18, 1991, at 52; Matthew Schifrin, Sellers Beware, Forbes, Jan. 21, 1991, at
36.
145. See Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Del. 1986) ("The rights
of debenture holders are controlled by the terms of the indenture."); see also Helvering v.
Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 200 (1942) (rights of warrant holder are "wholly
contractual"); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (adopting Delaware Supreme Court holding that a bondholder's interests "are protected by the contractual terms of the indenture"); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (rights of noteholders fixed
by contractual agreement); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974) (rights
confined to terms of indenture), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The FairnessRights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1165, 1175 (1990) ("the corporation owes its bondholders no extra-contractual duties").
146. See McDaniel, supra note 143, at 416.
147. See Mitchell, supra note 145, at 1175.
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extra-contractual duties on parties to contractual relationships. 4 ' Like

shareholders, bondholders entrust investments to corporate management

for extended periods, 4 9 and subject their investments to the same risks of

devaluation due to careless management or expropriation.'" 0 Moreover,

the bondholder/management relationship has all the earmarks of a fiduciary relationship and bondholders should be afforded the same protections as shareholders in the duties of care and loyalty.'

Not only do bondholders lack any extra-contractual protection, they
also lack protection in the contract formation stage. The terms of the
indenture are negotiated among the corporation, the underwriters, and
the indenture trustee, none of whom, as a practical matter, adequately
represent the interests of potential/prospective bondholders." 2 This lack

of bondholder representation destroys the premise that the bond agree-

ment is the result of arm's-length negotiations. 53 And individual investors-who have become increasingly involved in the bond market-have
even less power to negotiate indentures than traditional institutional
investors. ' 4
1. When Bondholders Deserve a Duty

There are, however, exceptions to the general rule. These are not true
exceptions, though, in that they constitute situations where bondholders'

interests become sufficiently similar to shareholders' interests that the
bondholders are afforded some protections. As bondholders become, or
are about to become, "owners" of the corporation-through corporate
insolvency or at the exercise of a conversion right-insiders are found to

owe them a duty.
a. Insolvency
Insolvency has long been recognized as imputing upon a corporation

certain duties to its bondholders.' 55 Defined generally, insolvency is the
148. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1422 (1989).
149. See Mitchell, supra note 145, at 1187.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1188 (arguing for a cause of action and derivative cause of action by
bondholders against management). Mitchell notes that, in all respects, the rights of
bondholders against management also should apply against controlling shareholders. See
i
152. See Mitchell, supra note 145, at 1179. Even theoretically, the trustee owes bondholders no fiduciary duty until the execution of the indenture. Id.
153. See id. at 1178-79. But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (underwriters incentive to sell bonds is sufficient to
protect bondholders' rights).
154. See McDaniel, supra note 144, at 415.
155. See Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 310 (1949); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) ("fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the
entire community of interests in the corporation--creditors as well as stockholders") (citation omitted); In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (insolvent corporation owes duty to creditors).
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inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they fall due.'5 6 Technical
insolvency is the inability to meet current obligations, even though assets
exceed liabilities.' 57 Presumably then, the corporate officer of an insolvent firm, who trades in the firm's debt issues without disclosing material
nonpublic information, may be held liable for insider trading under Rule
lOb-5, since upon insolvency the officer owes a duty to the bondholders.
The problem for officers is that they may have no notice that the firm is
insolvent and, indeed, that status can vary from day to day, making the
duty to bondholders turn on what time of day assets become available or
a credit line is approved.
When the person desiring to trade is the insolvent issuer itself, the issue of insolvency is less clear. While such transactions ordinarily invoke
the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933,158 a corporation that decides to proceed on existing disclosures may expose itself to
additional liability under Rule 1Ob-5.I 59 Against the threat of the heightened sanctions of Rule lOb-5, a firm's officers must weigh the chance that
disclosure of the state of the corporation may accelerate its demise by
"prematurely" alerting creditors and potential lenders.
b. Convertible Bonds
When the bond is convertible-giving the holder the right to convert it
into common stock-some courts have found that the corporation (and
insiders) owe some duty to the security holders since they are potential
shareholders." 6 In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 6 ' convertible bondholders who failed to convert prior to the redemption date of the bonds sued
Boeing, claiming it failed to give adequate notice of the redemption date.
The court held that underlying the indenture was a duty of fair treatment
which obligated the corporation to give adequate notice. 1 62 However, in
a later phase of the case, a different panel of the Second Circuit limited
the scope of the duty to one of good faith and fair dealing, arising out of
the contract alone. 163 Other courts have acknowledged similar duties to
give bondholders notice of matters material to the conversion decision.1
156. See Black's Law Dictionary 797 (6th ed. 1990).
157. See id.
158. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77vvv (1988 & Supp. 1991).
159. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9, at 1 (issuers near insolvency should disclose before purchasing debt securities).
160. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373
(2d Cir. 1975); Green v. Hamilton Int'l. Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
161. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975).
162. See id. at 1383.
163. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1977); see also William
W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L.
Rev. 667, 721 (rights limited to contract).
164. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 93942 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). Pittsburgh Terminal was brought under
Rule lob-5. The court, per Gibbons, J., held that the predicate duty to speak consistent
with Chiarella could be found in the issuer's contractual duty to speak. See id.
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C. The New Frontier?
One court, however, has found that a corporation owes bondholders a
duty, which, if breached, is sufficient to support a Rule lOb-5 insider
trading claim. In In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, convertible bondholders sued insiders who traded only in common stock. Their
claim was based on the text of Rule lOb-5 and the policy goals of section
10(b).16 5 While plaintiffs held securities convertible into common stock,
the case did not concern the exercise of conversion rights. 66 The court
found, however, that the market price of stock was connected to the
value of bonds and insider trading in stocks distorts the market for debentures. 167 Noting that the Supreme Court has emphasized the broad
coverage of Rule lOb-5's terms, 168 the court concluded that the plain language of the Act and the 1982 amendment which broadened the Act's
definition of "security" to include options, 6 9 manifested an intent to extend standing to holders of convertible bonds against inside traders of
stock. 70 Notwithstanding that there was no possibility of unfair advantage in a transaction between the corporation and its bondholders,17 1 the
court held that plaintiffs had standing due to the goal of securities law to
ensure "that 72no investor regardless of individual risk preferences, has to
1
risk fraud."'
Like critics of the no duty rule, the court reasoned that bondholders
have the same functional relationship with the corporation as shareholders. 17 They contribute capital and support the corporation in its ability
to attract equity.' 7 4 Both shareholders and bondholders are "justified in
presuming that corporate insiders are not abusing their positions by profiting from undisclosed corporate information."'7 5 The court refused defendant's motion to dismiss, holding by analogy, that insiders have a
"fiduciary duty" to bond purchasers and can be liable to the bondholders
when trading in breach of that duty. 7 6
The reasoning of the court harks back to the original insider trading
165. See In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,689, at 98,237 (N.D. Cal. October 19, 1990).
166. See id.
167. See id
168. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) ("a § 10(b)
action can be brought by a purchaser or seller of 'any security' against 'any person' who
has used 'any manipulative or deceptive device' "); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) ("[P]roscriptions... by statute and rule are broad and,
by repeated use of the word 'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive.").
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
170. See In re Worlds of Wonder, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,238.
171. No unfair advantage was possible since upon exercise of the conversion option,
shares would issue from authorized reserves, not in market purchases. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 98,239.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See id.
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theory of equal access espoused in Cady, Roberts and TGS and focuses on
the "structural" disparity between investors and insiders in their ability
to obtain information lawfully.' 7 7 The Worlds of Wonder court is the
only court to find a duty to disclose or abstain in the absence of a fiduciary-type duty and in the face of clear Supreme Court doctrine. However,
the Worlds of Wonder decision may also mark a return in securities law
to a more flexible interpretation of the statutory prohibitions.
CONCLUSION

The history of insider trading liability suggests that the SEC and lower
federal courts continue to think with an "equal access" mindset, though
they operate within the constraints of a strictly-read, common law fraudbased Rule lOb-5, as set forth in Chiarella. The inconsistencies that result from this tension can be remedied by a return to a more expansive
and flexible reading of the Rule as embodied by the equal access theory.
Under the equal access theory, persons who have regular access to material nonpublic information not legally available to others-an "unerodable informational advantage[ ]" ' 7 8-are prohibited from reaping the
benefits of their position at the expense of uninformed investors. The
prohibition would apply equally to outsiders or tippees who receive information from such persons and who know, or had reason to know, it is
nonpublic. In the context of debt securities, the imposition of the disclose or abstain duty would not disrupt management's duty to shareholders. It would require only that they deal fairly with the corporation's
bondholders. Moreover, such a theory more accurately reflects Congress' intent in enacting the securities laws and section 10(b), by protecting the ordinary investor and ensuring a level playing field. Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 were not meant merely to codify the law of fiduciary
obligations in the field of securities transactions. Rather, they were
designed to "'substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.' "179
177. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("structural disparity ... is critical factor under Rule lOb-5").
178. Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
FederalSecurities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 376 (1979).
179. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).

